The archicture of R&D joint projects: the social network analysis approach by Arranz, Nieves et al.
The architecture of R&D joint projects: the social network analysis approach  
This paper examines the effect of network properties on the performance R&D joint projects. 
In particular, we examine the impact of network cohesion, diversity and shape on the performance 
of these of exploration and exploitation R&D projects. We test these measures using data on 
projects from European R&D networks developed under the framework of Eureka projects. The 
empirical results indicated some network properties enhance the project’s performance and these 
differ depending on the kind of technological project developed. Our results suggest a lower 
heterogeneity, greater cohesion and network centralization in exploitation than in exploration 
projects. Our findings show different types of structures depending on the aim of the joint project 
and that there exist different degrees of cohesion between the partners that comprise the core and 
the peripheral nodes. 
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1. Introduction 
Networks as a way to organize partnership in joint projects have received considerable attention 
in the management and organization literature (Zheng et al., 2016; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
Although research has long recognized the importance of networks in technological fields, only 
recently have researchers begun to assess the structural properties of networks and their impact on 
innovation and performance (Arroyabe et al., 2015; Rank, 2008). Research on partnership 
considers that the role of network structure is critical to the performance of the project (Martínez-
Torres, 2014; Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma, 2010). Since partners often turn to their social contacts 
to seek information or resources (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2013), such structures are a 
crucial means of accessing diverse sources of knowledge (Bjorvatn and Wald, 2018). In addition, 
network structures help technology adoption providing intense interaction and communication 
among partners. This reason has led to study networks beyond the dyadic level to the network level 
seeking to understand the nature, effects and interdependencies in technological networks 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Despite researchers have recently addressed aspects of these 
questions (Martínez-Torres, 2014; Braha and Bar-Yam, 2007), studies have focused on firm’s 
position in alliances or in the proximity of the potential partners rather than the structure of the 
overall network. 
Joint R&D projects based on networks continue to be one of the most important ways for 
innovation. R&D projects make reference mainly two broad categories: exploration and 
exploitation. March defined exploration activities as those which includes “things captured by 
terms such as search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation”, while exploitation comprises “such things as refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution” (1991: 71). Researchers have pointed out that 
the flows and relations in these two kinds of projects structures may differ (Arranz and  Fernandez 
de Arroyabe, 2013). Thus, assuming March’s learning model (1991), in the case of exploration 
projects, the main structural characteristics are sparse and diverse networks, which facilitate access 
to a range of information that increases the diversity of the firm’s knowledge bases (Gilsing et al., 
2008). In the case of exploitation projects, the structural characteristics are cohesive and tightly-
integrated networks, which favour cooperation, sharing, and access to resources, all of which 
reinforce the firm’s knowledge bases (Bjorvatn and Wald, 2018). However, as noted by Gilsing 
and Duysters (2008), networks abundant in structural holes promote knowledge diversity, but this 
also results in high costs of knowledge implementation. Similarly, closed network structures 
reduce knowledge novelty and enhance the risk of obsolescence. These arguments raise the 
following question: what network properties will enhance the exploration and exploitation 
performance of projects?  
To address this question, we examine a group of network-based measures that capture the 
essence of joint projects and discuss the effect of these network properties on the performance of 
exploration and exploitation of technological projects. We test these measures using data on 
projects from European R&D networks developed under the Framework Programs. In particular, 
we examine the impact of network cohesion, diversity and shape on the performance of these 
projects. Thus, the level of cohesion in R&D projects accounts for how strongly interconnected its 
project members are, and is generally used to highlight the degree of constraint of actors as network 
members (Leon et al., 2017). The diversity in technological projects reflects how different the 
partners involved in exchanges are (Bessant et al., 2014). Finally, the shape informs about the 
heterogeneity of network connections as a result of the affinity between certain partners (Borgatti 
and Halgin, 2011).  
  
2. Network structure and project performance 
Joint projects in their development and organization are supported within a network structure, 
that is, in a set of partners connected by a set of ties (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). The partners can 
be firms and institutions of at least four different countries national or international firms and 
institutions, and the ties that connect partners serve as the “pipes” through which information flows 
(Takanashi and Lee, 2018; Gilsing et al, 2008). Joint projects, therefore, constitute a network 
structure in which each partner is considered a node of the network and network ties represent the 
relationship of collaboration in the development of the joint project. This provides a framework in 
which to understand network properties. Thus, the types of connections may vary from project to 
project, in what Rothaermel Deeds (2004) described as an exploration-exploitation model of 
organizational learning. Therefore, the partner’s choice to take part in a joint R&D project can be 
distinguished in terms of its motivation to exploit an existing capability or to explore new 
opportunities. Exploration involves innovation, basic research, invention, and new lines of 
business (Arranz and  Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2013). It focuses on the ‘R’ in the research and 
development process in which Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) define as search, variation, risk-
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, or innovation. Exploitation, in contrast, is 
associated with standardization, routinization, and systematic cost reduction, increasing the 
productivity of employed capital and assets and improving and refining existing capabilities and 
technologies (Gilsing et al., 2008). It focuses on the ‘D’ in the research and development process 
and is defined by Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, 
selection, implementation, or execution. According to Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), exploration 
and exploitation projects are related to and built on each other: exploration develops into 
exploitation, and exploration emerges from exploitation; exploration concludes with the product 
development process and exploitation finalizes when the product is on the market. 
Three structural characteristics of networks, as defined by Borgatti and Halgin (2011), play a 
particularly important role in the performance of projects: diversity, cohesion and shape. Diversity 
makes reference to the variety of alters which connect a partner with respect to a relevant 
dimension; cohesion explains the general level of connectedness of a structure, and shape indicates 
the overall distribution of ties. These measures are closely related to research conducted in recent 
years relating social structures and group performance, and so allows the results of our study to be 
interpreted within the context of previous research. 
2.1. Diversity 
From a structural viewpoint, the network of partners that develop a joint technological project 
may be made up of companies, universities, and other science-based institutions, which implies a 
great structural heterogeneity due to the diverse types of organizations that take part (Mitsuhashi 
and Min, 2016). In fact, from the social capital perspective, the necessity of this structural 
heterogeneity is emphasized. Thus, Vincenzo and Mascia (2012) point out that cognitive diversity 
derives from the collaborative ties that project members establish with other colleagues in different 
areas of expertise. This diversity also enhances the capacity for creative problem-solving and 
allows individuals to share different sets of contacts, skills, information, and experiences (Schilling 
and Phelps, 2007). Therefore, the greater the number of different types of actors to which a partner 
is linked, the greater the diversity of information and social support to which the partner has access.  
In the performance of the exploration projects, Gilsing et al. (2008), explain that while large 
distances in cognition have a negative effect on absorptive capacity, they have a positive effect on 
the potential for novelty creation. Gilsing et al. (2008) also point out the positive effects of large 
distances between partners on learning because of interaction yields opportunities for novel 
combinations of complementary resources. These authors conclude that while absorptive capacity 
declines with technological distance, novelty value increases. Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), 
suggested that exploration projects are characterized by partners’ heterogeneity (partners whose 
attributes differ from those of prior partners), while exploitation projects whose objectives involve 
the use and development of things already known, and in which absorptive capacity is a 
fundamental element (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2013), they observed a lesser 
heterogeneity. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: The heterogeneity of partners will be more effective in improving project 
performance in exploration joint R&D projects than in exploitation projects.  
Additionally, the structure of the joint R&D project is not only affected by this diversity of 
partners at its activity level (firm, university or research centre) but also in its cultural dimension 
due to the different countries from which the partners that normally take part in European projects 
proceed. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1b: The heterogeneity of countries will be more effective in improving project 
performance in exploration joint R&D projects than in exploitation projects. 
Since exploitative and explorative joint projects are fundamentally different in nature, the 
combination of countries and partners’ heterogeneity is expected to have a different impact on the 
two types of projects, therefore, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1c: The multiplicative interaction between heterogeneity of partners and countries 
will be more effective in improving project performance in exploration joint R&D projects than in 
exploitation projects.  
2.2 Cohesion 
Borgatti and Halgin (2011) defined the structural cohesion of a network as the degree to which 
actors are connected directly to each other by cohesive bonds. These connections between partners 
constitute an important source of information and resources for participants in the project. The 
social capital theory emphasizes the role of cohesion in networks not only as structures of exchange 
but also as governance mechanisms. Thus, Martinez-Torres (2014) indicated that strong ties are 
the appropriate channel for transferring tacit knowledge, while Gilsing et al (2008) argued that 
weak ties are conduits whereby an actor can access novel information. Moreover, other researchers 
have explained that the cohesion serves as a governance mechanism since these connections 
promote shared behavioural norms and cooperation (Bendoly et al., 2014) and increase mutual 
gains, reciprocity and long-term perspectives through repeated contacts (Bessant et al., 2014).  
The cohesion of a network may be measured by density, which is a ratio between the links 
present in the network and the total of all possible links between partners. Thus, depending on this 
variable it may define sparse networks if they have low contacts and dense networks if they have 
high links. Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) showed in the case of Toyota's suppliers two levels of 
network density depending on the processing of technological knowledge. Low density in those 
devoted to exploring technological information, and highly dense networks in those devoted to 
exploiting information for obtaining innovative products. Gilsing et al. (2008) also found that 
sparse networks are conduits whereby an actor can access novel information, while Burt (2004) 
suggested that people who stand near the holes in a social structure run a higher risk of having 
good ideas, and other studies have pointed out that network density limits the potential for novelty 
creation (Tseng et al., 2016). Based on these ideas, we suggest that in the performance of 
exploration projects, the influence of density will be less positive than in exploitation projects. 
While density ensures a greater quantity of information, this property may saturate the ability of 
the project to create new alternatives as a result of a large amount of information received by 
participating in multiple projects. Accordingly, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2a: The density of the network will be more effective in improving project 
performance in exploitation joint R&D projects than in exploration projects.  
Another way to examine the cohesion of a network is by measuring reach, that is, the degree to 
which any member of a network can reach other members of that network. Reach diminishes when 
the network has structural holes, i.e. static holes that can be strategically filled by connecting one 
or more links to join other points. Gilsing et al. (2008) pointed out that partners’ proximity is a 
structural property that facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge and enhances the build-up of 
absorptive capacity. In a similar sense, Bouncken (2011) concluded that absorptive capacity 
declines with the distance between partners. Hence, this approach suggests that network structures 
vary from highly integrated with close ties among partners whose fundamental goal is to exploit 
information, to networks with large distances between partners whose aim is to explore 
information. Alternatively, as Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) pointed out, reach serves as a 
governance mechanism. These authors conclude that the higher degree of proximity or reach 
among partners encourage the performance of collaboration projects –lessening situations of 
opportunistic behaviour–, and that exploitation projects are more binding than exploration projects. 
In essence, the greater the applicability of projects, as in the case of exploitation projects versus 
exploration projects, the greater the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Thus, we would expect that in 
the performance of exploitation projects reach would be an important structural characteristic of 
the network. Overall, this suggests the following: 
Hypothesis 2b: The proximity of partners will be more effective in improving project 
performance in exploitation joint R&D projects than in exploration projects.  
Hypothesis 2c: The multiplicative interaction between density and proximity will be more 
effective in improving project performance in the exploitation of joint R&D projects than in 
exploration projects.  
2.2. Shape 
Shape indicates the affinity between certain partners and derives from the homophily principle 
proposed by Borgatti et al. (2009). Borgatti et al. (2009) pointed out that homophily is produced 
when the members of the group have their closest ties to members who are similar to themselves. 
Borgatti and Halgint (2011) also noted that the heterogeneous distribution of connections in 
technological and social networks is the consequence of the affinity and privileged relations 
between partners resulting from the different roles that they adopt. Thus, in a homogeneous or 
random network the majority of nodes have the same number of links; in contrast, in a 
heterogeneous network, small groups of nodes, implying that there are dominant nodes, dominates 
the flows. Therefore, the shape shows the heterogeneity distribution of ties among nodes.  
Such heterogeneity, on the one hand, maybe due to the existence of a core and a peripheral 
partition of nodes that lead to a medium degree of centralization in the network, such as Gilsing 
and Duyster (2008) highlighted in the biotechnology sector. These authors also note that the core 
shows a high density as opposed to the low density exhibited by the connections in the peripheral 
nodes. Cuevas-Rodríguez (2014) attributed this distribution of ties among nodes to the 
requirements of governance structures, whose objectives are to solve conflicts, coordinate common 
tasks and distribute results. On the other hand, other authors remarked that technological networks 
are founded on a simple consensus-based structure, supported in a small group or central core of 
partners (Bessant et al., 2014), and coordinated generally by a network promoter whose capacity 
for decision-taking is limited and subject to the consensus of that central core (Fabrizi et al., 2016).  
Borgatti and Halgin (2011) also indicated that a network with high centralization has a high degree 
of robustness which can prevent the collapse of the network caused by the failure of a node when 
clusters of unrelated partners are formed. Given the different objectives described by Rothaermel 
and Deeds (2004) for exploration and exploitation projects, it may be suggested that the influence 
of network centralization should be more positive in exploitation projects than in the case of 
exploration projects. Since the existence of a central core of partners will facilitate the process of 
task execution and decision-making in the network, which may improve the performance of the 
project. Accordingly, we propose:   
Hypothesis 3a: Network centralization will be more effective in improving project performance 
in exploitation joint R&D projects than in exploration projects.  
On the other hand, heterogeneity may be because partners who share similar characteristics 
interact more among themselves than with partners that do not. This affinity results in denser areas 
in the network with the highest levels of interconnection between partners (clustering). Clustering 
allows quickly exchanging and integrating a wide range of sources leading to greater knowledge 
creation (Schilling and Phelps, 2007) so that clustering improves the transmission of information 
and the absorptive capacity between partners. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) also argue that bridges 
between clusters enable that different ideas and routines are distributed to other clusters, 
facilitating the recombination of previous and novel approaches. However, Braha and Bar-Yam 
(2007) point out that high clustering hinders the governance of the network, as a result of creating 
isolated units that neither facilitate the creation of trust nor eliminate the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour between partners. Therefore, we can anticipate that the influence of 
clustering will be more positive in the performance of exploration projects than in exploitation 
projects. Accordingly, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3b: Clustering will be more effective in improving project performance in 
exploration joint R&D projects than in exploitation projects.  
On the other hand, from the small size of exploitation projects, it is expected that the 
combination of clustering and centralization will enable that information to be exchanged and 
integrated quickly, facilitating both knowledge absorption and the governance of the project. 
Overall, this suggests the following:  
Hypothesis 3c: The multiplicative interaction between clustering and centralization will be 
more effective in improving project performance in exploitation joint R&D projects than in 
exploration projects.  
 
3. Methods   
3.1.Data 
In order to test the effect of network properties on the performance of the R&D projects, the 
data used in this study were extracted from a database built up in the context of a wider research 
on R&D projects developed within the framework of Eureka Program. The targeted population 
was made up of Eureka project managers. The literature has considered the project manager as 
the sponsor, who has the initiative for the development of the project, is in charge of 
coordinating all the partners, and maintains the contractual responsibility between the partners 
and the European Union (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2013). In fact, the project 
manager is responsible for the execution of the tasks, the budget and the execution time.  The 
sample size was selected at random by stratified sampling, proportional to groups of project 
type (exploration /exploitation) and European country, getting 650 projects managers. The data 
were obtained through a mail survey. The questionnaire was pretested on 10 project managers 
located in different countries. We thus obtained a final sample of 297 usable responses (121 for 
project managers of exploration projects and 176 for project managers of exploitation projects).  
In order to rule out possible biases of the survey, we conducted several ANOVA analyses at 
different mailing stages. No significant differences emerged between the different groups of 
responses. Because our dependent variables and some independent variables were obtained 
using the same survey instrument, we follow the methodology proposed by Podsakoff et al. 
(2003) in order to avoid common-method bias. Furthermore, we performed Harman’s single-
factor test whose result suggested the absence of common method bias. 
3.2 Measures 
Independent variables 
In social literature, diversity has been proposed under other terminologies such as bridging 
social capital, which explains its importance in many social phenomena (Borgatti et al., 2011). 
Diversity allows partners to connect with partners of many different types, which means that they 
could reach potential collaborators of a much wider spectrum of varied knowledge and expertise. 
Two main dimensions of diversity affect European joint R&D projects: the heterogeneity of both 
the partners and the countries.   
Heterogeneity of partners across R&D projects provides the requisite variety for recombination 
as pointed out by Martinez-Torres (2014). Regarding the heterogeneity of partners, Vincenzo and 
Mascia (2012) distinguished the following types: universities, research centres, and industries. In 
our study, each partner typology was determined by its frequency of participation in the network 
and measured by a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high frequency). Then we use the Gini coefficient 
dispersion degree of partners (Gp) to measure the degree of homogeneity of partners that take part 
in the project-network. This coefficient varies from 0 (heterogeneity of partners) to 1 (homogeneity 
of partners). 
As regards the heterogeneity of countries, and following a similar scheme, we measured the 
geographical heterogeneity taking into account the different countries that the partners involved in 
the project were from. We use the Gini coefficient countries heterogeneity (Gc) to measure the 
degree of homogeneity among the countries taking part in the network, which ranges between 0 
(heterogeneity of countries) and 1 (homogeneity of countries).  
The network cohesion refers to the connectedness of the structure and includes measures such 
as density and reach (Borgatti et al, 2009). The first measure we reported was density, defined by 
Borgatti et al. (2009) as the proportion of group members who are linked together in the network; 
the more partners are connected to one another, the denser the network is. Based on previous 
findings, density was measured as the sum of the actual number of ties of all the partners of the 
ego network and divided this by the sum of the maximum possible number of ties of all the 
components (Contractor and Monge, 2003). Thus, values close to 1 correspond to very dense 
networks; on the contrary, values close to 0 correspond to very sparse networks. 
Regarding reach, Borgatti and Halgin (2011) defined it as the average path distance between 
all pairs of members in a group. Reach, therefore, measures the extent to which all the nodes in 
the network are accessible to each other and then offers an overall idea of how cohesive the 
network is. Following Borgatti et al. (2002), this measure was calculated as the average distance-
weighted reach which can range from zero to n, with larger values indicating higher reach.  
Shape (Borgatti et al., 2009) is the overall distribution of ties in a network and includes measures 
such as centralization and clustering. Centralization reflects the extent to which interactions are 
concentrated in a small number of individuals rather than distributed equally among all members 
of the network; this is analogous to the variance of network ties per group member. We used the 
centralization measure defined by Borgatti and Halgin (2011), which is an expression of how 
tightly the network is organized around its most central node. Centralization reflects the extent to 
which interactions are concentrated in a small number of partners rather than distributed equally 
among all members of the network. 
Clustering measures the probability that ‘the partner of my partner is also my partner’, and 
provides insight into what is referred to as the neighbourhood structure of the network (Borgatti 
and Halgin, 2011). Following Borgatti et al. (2009), we measured the clustering coefficient or 
transitivity as the number of transitive triples divided by the number of potential transitive triples. 
Thus, if the value is near 1, the partners of anyone node have a high probability of being partners 
with each other.  
Dependent variable 
The project performance was measured using a survey completed by the project managers of 
the network. We used a perception measure that assessed partners’ satisfaction, defined as the 
degree to which project members consider association with the partners (Arranz and Fernandez de 
Arroyabe, 2013). Each of the survey respondents was asked about the extent to which they are 
satisfied: (1) with the overall performance of the project; (2) the financial performance of the 
project; and (3) with respect to the attainment of goals.   
Control variables 
Size of the network. The size was measured considering only those partners that take part in the 
project (with a contractual relation).  
Estimated Effort and Duration. Projects that involve more effort hours or work days may have 
been more difficult and may have required greater contacts between partners. To control for both 
of these potential effects we included the log of the estimated total person-hours and the total days.  
R&D intensity. Dichotomy variables were included to indicate whether the project in which the 
partner is involved was high-tech (HT), mid-high-tech (MHT), mid-low-tech (MLT) or low-tech 
(LT), using OECD (1997) classification, such that "0= non-belong to this group and 1= belong to 
this group". 
 
4. Results and discussion   
Tables 1a and 1b present the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients for all 
variables used in the models in order to distinguish the pattern of properties in the projects. Table 
2 presents the results of the regression analysis. Model fits are acceptable with significant chi-
square values (p < 0.01) and R2 values ranging from 0.299 to 0.501 for all specifications.  
Observing the results of Tables 1a and 1b it is possible to get an overall idea of how 
homogeneous a network is. Thus, regarding the type of partners, networks that develop exploration 
projects are more heterogeneous (heterogeneity partners, Gini= 0.44) than networks of exploitation 
projects, whose Gini coefficient is near to 1 (0.67). In the case of heterogeneity/homogeneity of 
countries, a slightly greater homogeneity is observed. This is also observed in the exploration 
projects (0.28) compared to the exploitation projects (0.45).  On the other hand, in Table 2, it is 
observed that in the exploration networks the country heterogeneity (β = -0.284, p < 0.05) is the 
variable with a positive and significant impact on the exploration projects performance. This 
positive effect suggests the importance of the geographical dispersion in the composition of 
partners that take part in exploration networks. Also, our results show that partners and 
geographical dispersion acting jointly (β = -0.225, p < 0.05) are more forceful in improving the 
performance of exploration projects.  These findings provide support for Hypothesis 1b and 1c 
since it is observed that for the case of exploitation projects the dispersion variables (partner and 
country heterogeneity) are not significant in their effect on project performance. These results 
complement previous studies from Gilsing and Duyster (2008), which identify the heterogeneity 
of resources as a condition for competitive advantages in the network. We extend their results by 
finding that this heterogeneity may act in R&D partnerships performance depending on the 
objective of projects. Our empirical evidence shows two characteristics, which may possess the 
information as a resource in an exploration project: heterogeneity, which allows partners to access 
novel information, and non-redundancy, which avoids the overload in the information processing 
capacity and facilitates the ability to detect new alternatives. 
The second block of descriptive variables of structural cohesion (density and reach) presents 
the degree of linkages among the partners of the network. It is observed, as the first group of 
characteristics, the important variability in the results of density (from 0.3 to 0.9, reaching average 
values of 0.51 for exploration and 0.77 for exploitation). These results are consistent with the 
arguments of Gilsing et al. (2008) which stated  in the case of exploration networks in the 
automotive and pharmaceutical industries, that density values were near zero indicating very 
sparse networks; and with Fabrizi et al. (2016) which concluded that density values were near to 
one in networks for technical consulting, indicating very dense networks. In the case of reach, we 
have obtained a variation from 0 to 4 nodes of distance between partners with average values of 
2.02 and 1.15. We note that these results show a low variability compared with previous studies. 
As Newman (2010) noted, the reason for that is due to the small size of networks. Thus in the case 
of exploration, we obtain an average value of about 10 partners per project, and in exploitation an 
average value close to 5 partners. As the second group of characteristics derived from cohesion 
variables, it is observed that results show a higher density in the case of exploitation projects (0.77) 
than in the case of exploration projects (0.51). Similarly, the reach variable shows a shorter 
distance in the case of exploitation (1.15) than in exploration projects (2.02). The reach variable 
tells us that, in exploitation projects, the average distance between pairs of nodes is “one degree of 
separation”, that is, there is a direct contact between partners, thus resulting in a more cohesive 
network than in the case of networks of exploration projects. Alternatively, the degree of cohesion 
is an important factor for the performance of the projects, based on the results of density (β = 
0.475; p < 0.01) and reach (β = -0.322, p < 0.05) variables. These findings support Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b. Moreover, the results indicated support for our argument that density and reach acting 
jointly (β = 0.392, p < 0.05) are more forceful in improving the performance of exploitation 
projects (Hypothesis 2c). Our results are consistent with previous literature in which it is pointed 
out that cohesion is a central variable for the governance of networks (Arroyabe et al., 2015), 
especially when the transmission of knowledge, its appropriateness, and avoidance of 
opportunistic behaviour are key factors in the success of the project.  
The third block of Tables 1a and 1b shows the structural variables related to the network shape. 
The first measure we explored was the centralization of the network. As Newman (2010) points 
out, one network is more centralized than another is when it has a core formed by a group of core 
nodes. With this objective, we calculated the K-core in both types of networks. Our results show 
two cores in the case of exploitation projects and three cores in the networks of exploration 
projects. These results provide some insights. The main core in exploitation projects contains on 
average 68% of the nodes, while only 23% are included in exploration projects. In the secondary 
core, in contrast, the distribution of partners in the core is more similar: on average 32% in 
exploitation projects and 35% in exploration projects. There is another secondary core in the case 
of exploration networks, which on average contains 42% of the remaining nodes. Therefore, a 
greater degree of centralization is observed for exploitation projects –through the participation of 
most of the partners in the main core–, which also reflects a high level of interconnection between 
nodes, than in the case of exploration projects. This outcome was confirmed as well by the results 
of clustering measurement. Moreover, our results show that centralization has a positive and 
significant effect on the performance of exploration (β = 0.199, p < 0.10) and exploitation projects 
(β = 0.210, p < 0.05). To confirm or refute Hypothesis 3a we performed a graphical analysis of the 
effect that centralization has on both types of projects, and as represented by the Figure 1, we 
observed a greater impact on the performance of the project in the case of exploitation projects 
than in exploration projects, which corroborates Hypothesis 3a. The literature has considered the 
centralization as a nearly exclusive property of exploitation activities and our results corroborate 
this empirical evidence. However, it also highlights the existence of a certain degree of  
centralization in exploration projects. These results are similar to Gilsing and Duyster (2008) when 
they indicated the existence of central and peripheral nodes in exploration projects, and when they 
highlighted the need for a certain degree of cohesion among partners as a governance mechanism 
of exploration networks. This argument is consistent with Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. (2014) who 
pointed out that many non-redundant ties will decrease the potential for novelty absorption because 
of the consumption of time and resources as well as the difficulty to absorb and integrate these 
novel insights. 
Alternatively, the clustering measure indicates an important variability. Thus, we have obtained 
values ranging from 0.10 to 0.90. Schilling and Phelps (2007), who obtained values from 0.05 to 
0.8, in projects whose objective was to obtain patents, also noted this variability, as a first aspect. 
A second aspect to highlight is that we find a higher level of clustering in exploitation projects 
(0.72) compared with exploration projects (0.45), which means that the probability of transitivity 
in interconnections is greater in exploitation than in exploration projects. Additionally, the smaller 
size of exploitation networks (5 nodes on average) versus exploration networks (10 nodes on 
average), provides a picture of the shape of exploitation projects compared with exploration 
projects: they are smaller, more centralized and have greater levels of interconnection among all 
nodes. Regarding the effect, that clustering has on the performance of the project, we note that 
neither of the two types of projects has obtained significant values, but we may state that the joint 
action of centralization and clustering has a positive and significant effect on exploitation projects 
(Hypothesis 3c). This finding is coherent with Bouncken (2011) arguments that the clustering with 
high proximity between the partners was an important factor in the transmission, and especially, 
in the absorption of knowledge by partners.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have studied the effect of network properties on the performance of exploration and 
exploitation joint projects from the social network perspective. The empirical results indicated 
support for our argument: some network properties enhance R&D project’s performance and these 
differ depending on the kind of technological project developed. Our results suggest a lower 
heterogeneity, greater cohesion and network centralization in exploitation than in exploration 
projects. Our findings are consistent with those of prior research in showing different types of 
structures depending on the aim of the R&D project (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2015) 
and that there exist different degrees of cohesion between the partners that comprise the core and 
the peripheral nodes (Gilsing and Duyster, 2008). Thus, our results for exploration are similar to 
Gilsing et al., (2008) which show that these networks have a low centrality level, and little cohesion 
(Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2014; Martínez-Torres, 2014). Regarding the networks whose objectives 
are exploitation, the properties displayed such as the creation of work teams, the participation of 
different types of partners and a high level of centralization are similar to those shown in previous 
studies (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).   
One of the key contributions of this paper is to highlight the effect of network structures in joint 
R&D projects. We contribute to the literature on project management by showing the impact of 
network properties on the performance of exploration and exploitation of joint R&D projects. Our 
results confirm that the diversity of partners, the cohesion and the overall distribution of ties in the 
network have a great impact on project results and on the performance perceived by partners, as 
well as the contingent character of the structure with the type of R&D project. 
Second, our research extends the social capital theory (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011) by analyzing 
the impact of some structural properties of networks on the performance of joint R&D projects.  
Our results add to this literature by suggesting that cohesive or closed networks are most 
appropriate when the goal of the network is more applied, whereas networks with structural holes 
or those that are more sparse and heterogeneous are suitable for finding novel information. 
Moreover, the results of this study also inform about the debate over network governance (Bendoli 
et al., 2014) indicating not only the role that social cohesion plays as a control mechanism but 
stressing the importance of the existence of a central core in the governance of the network 
regardless of the project developed.  
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Table 1a. Descriptive dates and correlation matrix (Exploration)  
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Density 0.51 0.23 1.000       
2. Reach 2.02 0.85 0.219** 1.000      
3. Clustering 0.45 0.27 0.199** 0.103* 1.000     
4. Centralization 0.33 0.16 0.015 0.092 0.059 1.000    
5. Heterogeneity (partners) 0.44 0.08 0.048 0.103* 0.017 -0.094 1.000   
6. Heterogeneity (countries) 0.28 0.07 0.076 0.056 0.015 -0.032 0.139** 1.000  
7. Performance 3.41 1.99 -0.121* 0.054 -0.034 -0.158 0.098 0.124* 1.000 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Descriptive dates and correlation matrix (Exploitation)  
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Density 0.77 0.13 1.000       
2. Reach 1.15 0.44 0.119** 1.000      
3. Clustering 0.72 0.10 0.145*** 0.160* 1.000     
4. Centralization 0.86 0.10 0.017 0.081 0.004 1.000    
5. Heterogeneity (partners) 0.67 0.19 0.020 0.099 0.045 -0.002 1.000   
6. Heterogeneity (countries) 0.45 0.14 0.051 0.053 0.037 -0.078 0.177 1.000  
7. Performance 4.37 1.52 0.203** 0.174* 0.113* 0.029 -0.014 -0.153 1.000 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
  
Table 2. Hypotheses testing  
Variables Exploration Exploitation 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Heterogeneity (partners)  -0.018   -0.049  0.099   0.072 
Heterogeneity (countries)  -0.284**   -0.216*  0.088   0.054 
H. partners x H. countries  -0.225*   -0.197*  0.046   0.066 
Density   -0.087  -0.074   0.475***  0.442*** 
Reach   0.028  0.033   -0.322**  -0.318** 
Density x proximity1   -0.034  -0.051   0.392**  0.330** 
Centralization    0.199* 0.181*    0.210** 0.204* 
Clustering    0.027 0.032    0.095 0.096 
Centralization x Clustering    0.074 0.099    0.125* 0.118* 
           
Size 0.328*** 0.297** 0.215** 0.310** 0.280*** -0.281** -0.118* -0.174* -0.150* -0.113* 
Effort 0.033 0.012 0.007 0.054 0.037 0.094 0.032 0.037 0.068 0.072 
HT 0.112* 0.099 0.084 0.109* 0.113* 0.123* 0.186* 0.194** 0.188* 0.159* 
MHT 0.095 0.074 0.101* 0.098 0.071 0.110* 0.092 0.136* 0.109* 0.077 
MLT 0.021 0.010 0.032 0.034 0.005 0.027 0.084 0.099 0.071 0.075 
LT 0.084 0.037 0.025 0.066 0.012 0.019 0.050 0.043 0.054 0.092 
ℝ2 0.311 0.328 0.394 0.350 0.477 0.299 0.399 0.351 0.304 0.501 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 1Proximity is measure as the invest of reach 
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Figure 1: Effect of network properties on performance project 
 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploitation 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploitation 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploration 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploration 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploration 
 
*Heterogeneity countries is not significant in exploration 
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